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ABSTRACT 
Development aid is commonly advocated as one of the most effective instruments to reduce 
international migration. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that push factors do not automatically 
result in massive migrations and that aid policies systematically fail to meet their stated objectives. 
Recently, several contributions have argued that an increase in sending countries’ wealth may lead to a 
rise in migration, rather than to a reduction, because it enables people to assume the costs and risks of 
migrating. However, despite the growing number of studies on this phenomenon, the role played by 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has not received attention yet. This paper is aimed at 
providing empirical evidence on this specific issue. In particular, we investigate the relation between 
ODA and international migration rates of Sub-Saharan countries. We argue that ODA may have a 
positive effect on migration decisions for two reasons. First, ODA improves workers’ ability to cover 
the costs of migration, by providing new job opportunities and in turn increasing incomes in the 
recipient country. Second, ODA, that is often associated with development programs in education, 
communication services and business opportunities, may also stimulate mobility aspirations of potential 
migrants. We develop an econometric analysis in order to investigate this hypothesis. Specifically, we 
perform a three-stage least square estimation on a sample of 48 Sub-Saharan countries. We build a two-
equation model, so as to allow for endogeneity of ODA, and find that ODA has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on migration outflows. Thus, as our main contribution, we argue that 
development aids are not substitute for migration and that the traditional aid policies (such as those of 
the European Union), aimed at curbing migration by providing international financial aids, might need 
to be reconsidered.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The long-standing assumption of a negative relation between economic development and migration is 
not longer accurate. While traditional theories of international migration suggest that poverty and 
economic underdevelopment are the fundamental causes of migration (Ravenstein, 1889, Lee, 1966, 
Stark and Bloom, 1985), aid policies have generally failed to meet their stated objectives (Castles, 
2004). A growing body of literature argues that, far from being paradoxical, this is the consequence of a 
misleading analysis of migration processes (Faini and Venturini, 1994, Martin and Taylor, 1996, 
Martin, 1998, Vogler and Rotte, 2000, Olesen, 2002). Indeed, an increase in sending countries’ wealth 
may lead to a rise in migration, rather than to a reduction, because it enables people to assume the costs 
and risks of migrating. As a consequence, if the sending countries show high levels of poverty, 
international economic aids may actually result in increased migration outflows. While the same 
literature has addressed the relationship between international economic relations and migration in 
general, the role played by Official Development Assistance (ODA, hereafter) has not received 
attention yet. This paper is aimed at providing empirical evidence on this specific issue. In particular, 
we investigate the relation between ODA and international migration rates of Sub-Saharan countries. 
Migration is a part of processes of social and economic change. People do not migrate simply to flee 
from poverty, but generally move in order to improve their social and economic living conditions. Thus, 
in order to migrate, people need financial resources as well as aspirations (De Haas, 2005). ODA may 
affect both these factors.  
On the one hand, international migration is costly and risky. Migrants must pay for transportation and 
for living expenses until they find a job in the new country, and illegal immigrants often make 
payments to intermediaries also for services and information. For example, Schiff (1994) argues that 
migration costs may be a constraint on migration, especially when combined with imperfect capital 
markets, and Hatton and Williamson (2006) show that mobility costs reduce migration decisions of 
financially constrained migrants. As a consequence, foreign aid may improve workers’ ability to cover 
the costs of migration, by providing new job opportunities and in turn increasing incomes in the 
recipient country.  
 3
On the other hand, it is widely recognized that migration is mainly driven by the feeling of relative 
deprivation rather than by absolute poverty. People’s aspirations are strongly dependent on the global 
disparities in life perspectives, so that improvements in education and the access to information may 
enhance the propensity to migrate. ODA, that is often associated with development programs in 
education, communication services and business opportunities, may in fact stimulate mobility 
aspirations of potential migrants. Moreover, ODA contributes to build international networks, vehicles 
for social integration, and socio-economic channels that improve the migrants’ capabilities to adapt to a 
new country, thus increasing the individuals’ choice set.  
Accordingly, the research hypothesis of this paper is that ODA by wealthy economies may have a 
positive effect on migration outflows of poor countries. 
Sub-Saharan countries offer a well-suited case study in order to investigate the relation between ODA 
and international migration for several reasons. First, Sub-Saharan countries are one of the primary 
source areas of international migration. Second, they show patterns of migration and economic 
conditions that are very different from what traditional theories would predict (namely, countries with 
the lowest income generally do not exhibit the highest emigration rates). Third, Sub-Saharan countries 
for a long time have been recipient of aid policies aimed at reducing migration by addressing its alleged 
root causes, i.e. poverty and economic underdevelopment. Yet, strong push factors do not automatically 
result in massive migrations and aid policies systematically fail to meet their objective. 
In order to investigate whether ODA that Sub-Saharan countries receive affects their emigration rates, 
we perform a three-stage least square estimation on a sample of 48 countries. In particular, we build a 
two-equation model so as to allow for endogeneity of ODA with respect to the internal economic 
conditions of individual countries and their international trade relations. Our empirical findings show 
that ODA has a positive and statistically significant effect on migration outflows, also controlling for 
those factors that are generally indicated as the most influential on mobility decisions. Thus, as our 
main contribution, we argue that development aids are not substitute for migration and that the 
traditional aid policies (such as those of the European Union) might need to be reconsidered.   
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This paper relates to the literature on the so-called “migration hump”. In 1971, Zelinksy suggested a 
mobility transition hypothesis, in which he linked the concept of demographic transition to economic 
development and migration. In this theory, migration follows an inverted U-curve path through the 
phases of demographic transition. In particular, international migration should be at the pick in 
correspondence of an intermediate phase of economic development, when a rapid decline in mortality 
determines major population growth and migration pressure. Although the Zelinksy’s theory constitutes 
in an a-historical model within a traditional modernization scheme, it also provides the first attempt to 
conceptualize migration as non-linear in time and economic growth. The intuition of Zelinsky has been 
further explored and developed by recent contributions. While some authors argue that migration is a 
phenomenon social in nature and that it is not purely determined by push and pull factors (Mitchell, 
1989, Portes and Borocz, 1989, Zolberg, 1989), others explicitly focus on international economic 
relations as an important influence on migration patterns (see, e.g., Schiff, 1994, Martin, 1998, Vogler 
and Rotte, 2000) and find that economic growth – whether driven by trade liberalization, foreign direct 
investments and aids – might increase people’s ability to migrate abroad (Faini and Venturini, 1994, 
Martin, 1993, Martin and Taylor, 1996, Olesen, 2002). So that, this literature argues, economic 
development is likely to lead to more migration from poor countries in the short/medium term.  
Our paper is aimed at providing an empirical contribution to such a literature, offering some evidence 
from real data. However, it is worth emphasizing that we do not investigate time patterns of migration 
outflows of a given country along with ODA that the same country receives, rather we develop a cross-
country analysis in order to assess whether ODA is actually relevant in explaining the variability of the 
migration outflows across countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section some descriptive 
statistics on the relation between ODA and migration outflows of Sub-Saharan countries are introduced. 
Then, we present the data used in the empirical analysis, the econometric specification and the 
estimation results. Concluding comments are offered in the last section. 
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STYLIZED FACTS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Sub-Saharan countries show patterns of migration flows very different from what the traditional push-
pull factors theory would predict: poverty and economic underdevelopment do not result in massive 
migrations, rather countries with low income exhibit also low emigration rates. Data provided by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2008) indicate that the emigration 
rates of Sub-Saharan countries vary widely across them. In particular, OECD uses data from national 
census of population and calculates the emigration rate from a given country of origin by dividing the 
expatriate population (aged 15+) from that country by the native-born population (aged 15+) of the 
same country. Exploring these data (which refer to 2004), we note that the highest emigration rate is 
that of Capo Verde (25.5%) and the lowest is that of Niger (0.09%). Only 5 countries (Capo Verde, 
Seychelles, Sao Tome, Mauritius and Comoros) have an emigration rate greater than 5%, while 
countries with a larger population have, in general, a lower emigration rate. Table 1 presents a list of 48 
Sub-Saharan countries and their emigration rates. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 Moreover, as we have mentioned above, differences in emigration rates do not seem to be dependent 
on the main internal socio-economic characteristics of individual countries. For example, the two Sub-
Saharan countries with the highest emigration rate (Cape Verde and Seychelles) show relatively high 
values of Human Development Index (HDI): respectively 0.73 and 0.84. At the opposite, two of the 
countries with the lowest emigration rates (Niger and Burkina Faso) show relatively low values of HDI: 
0.37 in both cases. 
Several studies have tried to identify the main determinants of emigration flows from Sub-Saharan 
countries. While some of them focus on the role played by push factors, such as poverty and political 
instability (e.g., Adepoju, 1994, and Oucho, 1995), others have recognized that migration flows of Sub-
Saharan countries do not substantially follow the fluctuations of differential opportunities across 
economies, but tend to depend on social and economic networks across national borders (see, for 
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instance, Black et al., 2004). Following some of the intuitions of the migration hump theory, we believe 
that also ODA may be an influence on international emigration from Sub-Saharan nations.  
OECD (1996, 2009) defines ODA as those flows to eligible ODA recipients or multilateral 
institutions that are administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective. As we have argued in the introduction, there are two reasons 
why ODA may positively affect migration decisions of people. Firstly, ODA is likely to increase 
income from labor and in turn to improve workers’ ability to cover the costs of migration. Secondly, 
ODA contributes to build international socio-economic networks and it might so enhance the propensity 
to migrate. As a consequence, the higher the level of ODA that a given wealthy economy directs to a 
poor country, the higher may be the migration flow from the latter to the former.  
Let us consider, for example, the case of France, which has strong cultural and economic relationships 
with many Sub-Saharan countries. For many years French-Senegalese co-development plans have tried 
to reverse the exodus of Senegalese, by enhancing business opportunities in Senegal within economic 
aid programs. Such initiatives also promoted the voluntary return of Senegalese by providing assistance 
to migrant workers for reinsertion, in the forms, among others, of credit funds and training-for-return 
programs (Diatta and Mbow, 1999). Nevertheless, migration flows from Senegal to France have 
showed no signs of reduction, but rather they increased from 910 individuals in 1996 to 2550 
individuals in 2004 (source: OECD, 2008). In our opinion, one of the explanatory factors of this 
phenomenon is ODA. Figure 1 shows levels of net ODA (expressed in millions of US dollars) directed 
from France to some Sub-Saharan countries and migration flows (expressed in number individuals) 
from these countries to France (data refer to 2004), where net ODA comprises contributions of donor 
government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral 
institutions, and disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions, while lending by export 
credit agencies - with the pure purpose of export promotion - is excluded (OECD, 2008). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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The two variables’ patterns are surprisingly similar. In particular, because of data availability 
constraints, we consider three France’s ex-colonies (Senegal, Madagascar and Togo), one Portugal’s ex-
colony (Uganda) and one UK’s ex-colony (Angola). Across them (as well as within the group of the 
three France’s ex-colonies) ODA and emigration flows seem to be linked by a positive relation. 
Moving from the point of view of the ODA donor country to that of the recipient, the picture does not 
change substantially, but it appears even clearer. Because of data availability constraints, again, we 
consider only a few Sub-Saharan recipient countries and their major donor partners. Specifically, Figure 
2 reports the levels of ODA received (expressed in millions of US dollars) from given countries and 
migration outflows (expressed in number individuals) towards these individual countries, for Kenya, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Madagascar. Also in this case, ODA and 
migration follow a similar cross-country pattern.  
 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
 
From such an evidence, it emerges the suspect that international aids and migration outflows are 
actually linked. However, this descriptive presentation of data does not allow us to deduce whether the 
relation of causality goes from ODA to migration or vice-versa and whether it is statistically significant 
or not. Thus, we go deeper and, in the following sections, develop an inferential analysis. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION  
Before going to the econometric specification, let us make clear what precisely we want estimate. The 
aim of the econometric study is to investigate if ODA is relevant (from a statistical point of view) in 
explaining the variability of the migration outflows across Sub-Saharan countries. Unfortunately, 
disaggregated data on ODA (according to donor country) and on emigration rates (according to 
destination country) are not available for all Sub-Saharan countries. Therefore, in order to perform an 
econometric estimation, we are forced by the data availability to pose some limitations to our analysis. 
On the one hand, we consider total ODA (as a sum of ODA from all donor countries) received by 
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individual Sub-Saharan countries; on the other hand, we look at migration outflows (expressed in 
emigration rates, as defined by OECD – see the previous section –) from individual Sub-Saharan 
countries to any destination country. These limitations, however, lead us to more general results, as they 
allow us to investigate the effect of ODA received on total migration outflows from a given country, 
without focusing on one specific destination only. 
We construct the sample according to the following procedure: firstly, we define dependent and 
independent variables, then we choose the control variables. 
On the one hand, we use the country-specific emigration rate (calculated by dividing the expatriate 
population, aged more than 15, from a given country by the native-born population, aged more than 15, 
of the same country; source: OECD, 2008) as dependent variable. On the other hand, we specify the 
emigration rate as a function of the total net ODA (in US dollars) received by the individual country 
weighed by its GNI. The most basic question for using economic variables like ODA is which 
denominator best represents the importance of ODA for receiving countries, in order to make valid 
inter-country comparisons. In this paper, we weight ODA by the GNI. Indeed, the relevance of ODA 
for the recipient country is mainly dependent on its economic size and the GNI offers a generally 
accepted measure of it (notice that unreported estimations, performed using the country’s population as 
a weight for ODA, show substantially similar final results). Nevertheless, ODA is likely to be 
endogenous. In particular, the level of ODA may be dependent on the internal economic conditions of 
the recipient country (if ODA donors direct higher levels of ODA towards those countries that show 
higher poverty) and on the international economic relations between poor and wealthy economies. For 
this reason, we consider ODA as an endogenous variable so as to increase the overall robustness of the 
results. Specifically, in our model, ODA is allowed to react to the country’s GNI per capita (source: 
World Bank, 2008), poverty (measured by the human poverty index by UN, 2008) and merchandise 
trade as percentage of GDP (measured as the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the 
value of GDP; source: World Bank, 2008). Figure 3 reports levels of emigration rates and net ODA 
(weighted by the GNI) for the considered 48 Sub-Saharan countries (notice that, even if the relation 
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between the two variables appears weak from a descriptive point of view, it may well be statistically 
significant). 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The selection of the control covariates is a crucial issue, indeed only avoiding misspecification 
problems the reliability of the results can be guaranteed. Since, in our analysis, we try to explain 
differences in emigration rates between source countries, we do not really need to include pull factors in 
the econometric model; thus, we mainly focus on push factors. In general, the push factors concern the 
country’s living conditions. Given data availability constraints, we choose three main aspects shaping 
living conditions of people in Sub-Saharan countries: poverty, human development and war. We 
measure poverty and human development by using, respectively, the human poverty index (HPI, 
hereafter) and the human development index (HDI, hereafter) provided by the UN Statistical Database 
(UN, 2008). While the HPI includes the probability at birth of not surviving at age 40, the adult 
illiteracy rate, the percentage of population not using an improved water source and the percentage of 
children under weight-for-age, the HDI is composed by a life expectancy index, an education index and 
GDP per capita. In order to control for the presence of war, we consider a dummy variable which takes 
a value of 1 for those countries that are involved in war or conflicts according to a generally accepted 
map of African conflict areas (see Unicef, 2009). Moreover, we include in our operative model also two 
proxies for the people’s access to international news and political information. We consider, on the one 
hand, the number of internet users as a percentage of the entire population (source: World bank, 2008), 
on the other hand, the number of televisions per 100 inhabitants (television with its images of the 
“wealthy west” may have a strong influence on people’s desire to migrate; in this case the source of 
data is the International Telecommunication Union – ITU – 2008). Finally, we include a set of dummy 
variables in order to control for the effects of the last colonizer countries (Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Italy and France), in an attempt to assess the potential influences due to different 
systems of past and present political international relations. Table 2 presents a descriptive analysis of 
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the sample used in the empirical estimation (the variables are referred to 2004, the most recent possible 
in order for valid inter-country comparisons to be made; the sample covers 48 countries). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
As Table 2 shows, the net weighted ODA is widely variable across countries. On the one hand, 
Liberia registers the highest value (0.265) and Burundi (0.154) and Democratic Republic of Congo 
(0.133) follow. On the other hand, South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius are at the bottom of the 
distribution with a net weighted ODA lower than 0.003. The average GNI per capita is 2400 US dollars; 
in particular, the richest country is Seychelles (more than 11000 US dollars) and the poorest are Liberia 
and Democratic Republic of Congo (240 US dollars). On average, Sub-Saharan countries do 
merchandise trade for more than 60% of their GDP, and only four countries (Equatorial Guinea, 
Lesotho, Mauritania, Seychelles and Swaziland) trade for an overall value greater than their GDP. The 
synthetic indexes of human development and poverty are in general low: the mean of the former is 0.51 
(while, for example, for all the European countries it is greater than 0.9) and the mean of the latter (that 
is normalized between 0 and 100) is about 37. Fifteen countries result involved in a war. The use of 
internet is very low spread among Sub-Saharan countries: on average only 2.58 individuals every 100 
individuals are internet users and only three countries have more than ten internet users every 100 
individuals (Seychelles, Sao Tome, Mauritius). The number of televisions per 100 inhabitants is, on 
average, 6.96 (the lowest value is that of Rwanda and the highest that of Sudan). Finally, 19 countries 
were colonies of United Kingdom, 18 of France, 5 of Portugal, 3 of Italy, 2 of Belgium and 1 of Spain. 
Formally, we consider the following cross-country two-equation model:  
iiiiiiiii COLONYTVINTERNETWARHDIHPIODAER εββββββββ ++++++++= 76543210                   (1) 
iiiii TRADEGNIHPIODA υγγγγ ++++= 3210                                                                                          (2) 
where symbols have the following meaning: ERi (emigration rate), ODAi (net official development 
assistance weighted by the country’s gross national income), HPIi (human poverty index), HDIi (human 
development index), WARi (presence of war or conflicts), INTERNETi (internet users as a percentage of 
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total population), TVi (number of televisions per 100 inhabitants), COLONYi (last colonizer country), 
GNIi (gross national income per capita), TRADEi (merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP), the 
vectors β = [β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7] and γ = [γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3] define the parametric structure (in 
particular β0 and γ0 are the two model constants), while εi and υi are the error terms. Variables’ 
descriptions are given above in this section. Given the small number of observations, we start 
considering an abridged version of the model and progressively add the controls, so testing the 
estimation robustness and controlling for multi-collinearity problems due to potential correlation 
between covariates. As equations (1) and (2) show, we allow ERi to react to ODAi and, simultaneously, 
ODAi to react to HPIi, GNIi and TRADEi. Consequently, εi is likely to be correlated with ODAi. Thus, 
we jointly estimate the two equations using a three-stage least square procedure. In this way, we try to 
control for the potential endogeneity of ODAi with respect to some variables that in turn may influence 
ERi.1 Notice that we cannot include ERi directly in equation (2) as a covariate, since this would make to 
deduce the structural parameters from the known reduced form parameters impossible (i.e. the so-called 
identification problem).  
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the estimation results of, respectively, abridged and extended model 
specifications. In both tables, while the first column reports the variables, the remaining columns report 
the estimated parameters of the various model specifications. The two-equation parameters, 
simultaneously estimated, are reported in succession. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The parameter estimates are broadly stable across the various specifications. As one can notice, our 
hypothesis of a statistically significant effect of ODA on migration outflows finds strong support in the 
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data. Indeed, all the model specifications (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) that we consider, reported 
respectively from the second to the fifth column of Table 3 and from the second to the fourth column of 
Table 4, show that the level of net ODA (weighted by the country’s GNI) that an individual country 
receives has a positive and statistically significant effect on the migration rate of the same country. In a 
three-stage least square estimation, the estimated coefficients can be considered as marginal effects, 
thus we can calculate that, for example, an increase of one dollar of ODA every 100 dollars of GNI 
increases the emigration rate from 0.2 percent, as in model specification (d), to 11.1 percent, as in 
model specification (g). Moreover, we find that the level of ODA that a country receives depends on its 
poverty (as measured by the human poverty index), on its GNI per capita and on its economic openness. 
Specifically, the model specifications (a), (c), (f) and (g), reported respectively in the second and fourth 
column of Table 3 and in the third and fourth column of Table 4, show that the HPI has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on ODA; the model specifications (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g), 
reported respectively from the second to the fifth column of Table 3 and from the second to the fourth 
column of Table 4, show that the GNI per capita has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
ODA; and the model specifications (b), (d) and (e), reported respectively in third and fifth column of 
Table 3 and in the second column of Table 4, show that the merchandise trade (as a percentage of GDP) 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on ODA. Finally, in the model specifications (c), (f) and 
(g), reported respectively in the fourth column of Table 3 and in the third and fourth column of Table 4, 
the variable TRADEi does not come out as statistically significant because of correlation problems with 
the other two variables considered in equation (2).  
Other interesting results are obtained. All the considered model specifications unveil that the 
country’s poverty (measured by the HPI) has a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
country’s emigration rate, while the economic development (measured by the HDI) has a positive and 
statistically significant effect. These latter findings corroborate our research hypothesis, by showing that 
the material deprivation may negatively affect people’s ability to migrate and that the economic 
development may open socio-economic channels relevant on mobility decisions. These results are also 
consistent with the migration hump theory (Martin and Taylor, 1996, Martin, 1998, Vogler and Rotte, 
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2000, Olesen, 2002), indeed they show that, in a relatively poor sending country (such as Sub-Saharan 
countries), an increase in the economic conditions of people has a positive impact on the propensity to 
migrate, because the financial constraints of the poorest become less binding. 
We also find that the use of internet and of the television by Sub-Saharan individuals has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on their probability of emigrating. On the one hand, by using internet, 
people have access to international news and political information. On the other hand, the television, 
which opens a window on the living standards of wealthy economies, may have an influence on 
people’s desire to migrate. Notice that the variable TVi turns out as statistically significant only in the 
model specification (d), where the variable INTERNETi is not included, since the two variables show a 
positive correlation. Surprisingly, the variable WARi does not show a statistically significant effect on 
emigration rates, what is probably due to the fact that the presence of war and conflicts mainly affect 
internal and regional migration rather than international mobility. 
In conclusion, the last colonizer country does not emerge as a substantial influence on emigration 
rates. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that, in our econometric analysis, we consider migration 
outflows to any destination country, so that the effect of economic and political bilateral relations 
between couples of individual countries of origin and destination is not assessed by this estimation. 
We have performed a diagnostic analysis of both the estimation strategy and results. First, we have 
implemented the Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions on equation (2), in order to evaluate if 
the instrumental variables used in equation (2) (namely, HPIi, GNIi, and TRADEi) have a statistically 
significant role in explaining the cross-country variation of ODA. The test results lead us to not reject 
the null hypothesis (at the conventional level of significance, 5%), thus the instrumental variables used 
in equation (2) pass the test and they are statistically validated. Second, as an overall diagnostic 
procedure, we have performed the Wald test on all the model specifications; the test results, 
notwithstanding the small number of observations, lead us to reject the null hypothesis of joint non 
statistical significance of all the parameters. Statistical details of the abridged model specifications are 
reported in Table 3, while those of the extended model specifications are collected in Table 4.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Restrictive immigration policies by the European countries have largely failed to curb migration from 
Africa. In response to these failures, development aid is commonly advocated as a “smart solution” (De 
Haas, 2004). It is often argued, indeed, that only economic development can reduce migration from 
poor countries, given that the root causes of migration are poverty and differentials in economic 
opportunities between source and destination countries (see, for example, Ruebens, 1983). Yet the 
relation between migration and international economic aids seems to be more problematic than a large 
literature believes. Many studies have already pointed out that development-enhancing policies are not 
substitutes for migration, rather they may enable people to assume the costs and risks of migrating, by 
increasing people’s financial and social capabilities to move abroad (e.g., Schiff, 1994, Martin and 
Taylor, 1996, Martin, 1998, Vogler and Rotte, 2000). In this paper, we have focused on Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). We have performed a three-stage least square estimation on a sample 
of 48 Sub-Saharan countries and showed that ODA has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
migration outflows. We interpret this result arguing that, on the one hand, ODA may improve workers’ 
ability to cover the costs of migration, by providing new job opportunities and in turn increasing 
incomes in the recipient country, on the other hand, ODA, that is often associated with development 
programs in education, communication services and business opportunities, may also stimulate mobility 
aspirations of potential migrants. Notice that, while we have provided some evidence on the similarity 
of patterns of ODA and migration flows between couples of individual countries of origin and 
destination, the econometric analysis, given data availability constraints, is performed by using 
aggregated data on total net ODA received by individual Sub-Saharan countries and on migration 
outflows to any destination country. Thus, our estimation results do not allow us to argue that there is a 
statistical relation between the level of ODA that one wealthy economy directs to a given recipient 
country and the number of immigrants from the same recipient country towards the given donor; but 
they only show, more generally, that total net ODA has a positive and statistical significant effect on 
aggregated migration outflows. We also find other two interesting relations. First, we show that ODA 
cannot be taken as an exogenous variable, while it is strongly dependent on the level of the recipient’s 
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poverty and economic openness, in such a way that the higher the level of a country’s poverty and 
economic openness, the higher the level of ODA that the same country receives. Second, emigration 
rates are positively affected by the country’s economic development and negatively affected by its 
poverty, what contrasts the prediction of the traditional push-pull factors theory (Ravenstein, 1889, Lee, 
1966, Stark and Bloom, 1985). In our opinion, these findings have a strong policy implication. 
Specifically, they corroborate the argument that international development aids are not substitute for 
migration and suggest that there is a considerable gap between certain theories and empirical evidence. 
Therefore, migration policies shaped on the traditional belief that economic development will eliminate 
the economic incentives to emigrate should be reconsidered: in a context of deep poverty, a modest 
increase of personal resources may be not enough to guarantee people’s fulfillment, while it may 
enhance people’s financial resources, that can be used to migrate, as well as aspirations to do so. 
Migration policies based on empirical evidence would probably be more effective. 
 
 
NOTES
                                                 
1 Let us call X = [X1, X2] the matrix of regressors, where X1 is a matrix composed of variables assumed exogenous 
with respect to the emigration rate, while X2 is made of m variables that are suspected to be endogenous in the 
model (ODA in this case). Select a number k ≥ m of instrumental variables Z that satisfy the two fundamental 
requirements that Cov(Z, X2) ≠ 0 (relevance) and Cov(Z, ζ) = 0 (exogeneity). Then a system 2SLS is 
implemented, where, in the first stage, X2 is regressed over Z and a constant. The parameter estimates so generated 
are then saved and used to form a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the disturbances ζ that allows for 
correlation of the residuals across the equations of the system. The covariance matrix is finally adopted as a 
weighting matrix to re-estimate the system and get the new values of the parameters in the last step. The last two 
steps are iterated over the estimated disturbance covariance and parameter estimates until the parameter estimates 
converge. 
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Table 1. Emigration rates of Sub-Saharan countries (population 15+, year 2004). 
    
Country Emigration 
rate 
  
Country Emigration 
rate 
Cape Verde 25.55 Mali 0.77 
Seychelles 12.40 Togo 0.71 
Sao Tome and Principe 11.34 Côte d'Ivoire 0.69 
Mauritius 9.33 Uganda 0.68 
Comoros 5.19 Cameroon 0.65 
Equatorial Guinea 4.43 Zambia 0.64 
Guinea-Bissau 3.62 Guinea 0.48 
Congo 3.53 CtralAfricanRep. 0.45 
Somalia 2.86 Botswana 0.44 
Angola 2.85 Benin 0.41 
Gambia 2.58 Dem. Rep. of Congo 0.38 
Senegal 2.44 United Rep. of Tanzania 0.37 
Liberia 2.30 Randa 0.37 
Eritrea 2.02 Nigeria 0.36 
Ghana 1.47 Ethiopia 0.36 
Sierra Leone 1.42 Swaziland 0.34 
Gabon 1.42 Namibia 0.31 
Djibouti 1.39 Burundi 0.28 
South Africa 1.14 Malawi 0.26 
Kenya 1.13 Sudan 0.22 
Zimbabwe 1.09 Chad 0.15 
Mauritania 0.97 Burkina Faso 0.14 
Madagascar 0.87 Lesotho 0.10 
Mozambique 0.82 Niger 0.09 
    
Source: OECD, 2008. 
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Figure 1. France’s ODA in USD millions to given countries - grey, right scale - and migration flows to France 
in individuals - white, left scale - (year 2004). 
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Source: OECD, 2008. 
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Figure 2. Migration flows in individuals from given countries - white, left scale - and ODA in USD millions to 
the same country (from given donors) - grey, right scale - (year 2004). 
 
Source: OECD, 2008. 
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Figure 3. Emigration rates and net ODA weighted by GNI (year 2004). 
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Table 2. Sample description (48 Sub-Saharan countries, year 2004). 
     
Variable 
 
Min Max Mean 
 
(St.Dev.) 
  
Emigration rate  0.09 25.55 2.33 (4.35) 
Net ODA/GNI (US dollars) 0.01 0.26 0.05 (0.05) 
Internet users (%)  0.00 24.00 2.58 (4.69) 
GNI per capita 240 11430 2419 (3077) 
Trade (% GDP) 19.00 163.00 63.62 (32.26) 
Human development index 0.34 0.84 0.51 (0.11) 
Human poverty index 11.40 56.90 37.38 (10.57) 
Number of televisions (100 inh.) 0.01 38.60 6.96 (8.72) 
Presence of war or conflicts 0 1 0.33 (0.48) 
     
Source: OECD, 2008. 
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Table 3. Cross-country estimation results (3SLS): abridged model versions. 
VARIABLE  MODEL (a)  MODEL (b)  MODEL (c)  MODEL (d) 
         
Eq. 1. Dep. Var. : ERi  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.) 
         
ODAi   58.551   44.935   53.634   20.897 
  (20.884) ***  (20.573) **  (20.732) ***  (13.039) * 
HPIi   -0.154  -0.106  -0.803    -- 
  (0.035) ***  (0.036) ***  (1.027) ***   
HDIi   8.922   6.887   8.462    -- 
  (2.828) ***  (2.799) **  (2.817) ***   
WARi  -0.803  -0.869  -0.803  -1.924 
  (1.022)  (1.050)  (1.027)  (1.280) 
INTERNETi   0.359   0.366   0.361    -- 
  (0.128) ***  (0.132) ***  (0.129) ***   
TVi    --    --    --   0.224 
        (0.053) *** 
         
Eq. 2. Dep. Var. : ODAi  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.) 
         
HPIi   0.001    --   0.001    -- 
  (0.001) ***    (0.001) ***   
GNIi  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001) **  (0.001) ***  (0.001) **  (0.001) *** 
TRADEi    --   0.001   0.001   0.001 
    (0.001) ***  (0.001)  (0.001) *** 
         
 
Statistical details:  
  
        
Wald test (eq. 1): p-value   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
R-square (eq. 1)   0.501   0.580   0.536   0.401 
Wald test (eq. 2): p-value   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
R-square (eq. 2)   0.553   0.428   0.560   0.428 
Sargan test [p-value]   3.734 [>5%]   2.090[>5%]   2.090 [>5%]   1.765 [>5%] 
         
Note: level of confidence of statistical significance (“*” = 90%, “**” = 95%, “***” = 99%).  
Source: OECD, 2008. 
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Table 4. Cross-country estimation results (3SLS): extended model versions. 
VARIABLE  MODEL (e)  MODEL (f)  MODEL (g) 
       
Eq. 1. Dep. Var. : ERi  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.) 
       
ODAi   43.449   107.327   111.033 
  (21.718) *  (29.705) ***  (32.397) *** 
HPIi   -1.109  -0.239  -0.255 
  (0.036) ***  (0.038) ***  (0.038) *** 
HDIi   7.427   13.497   14.380 
  (3.486) **  (3.420) ***  (3.996) ** 
WARi  -0.801  -0.482  -0.316 
  (1.106)  (0.874)  (0.955) 
INTERNETi   0.375   0.385   0.404 
  (0.134) ***  (0.113) ***  (0.111) *** 
TVi  -0.021    --  -0.042 
  (0.079)    (0.070) 
BELGIUMi    --  -3.164  -3.212 
    (2.833)  (2.876) 
UKi    --  -3.130  -2.913 
    (1.527) **  (1.609) * 
FRANCEi    --  -1.688  -1.580 
    (1.524)  (1.526) 
SPAINi    --   2.741   3.070 
    (3.056)  (3.076) 
PORTUGALi    --   2.825   3.068 
    (2.393)  (2.636) 
ITALYi    benchmark  benchmark  benchmark 
       
Eq. 2. Dep. Var. : ODAi  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.)  Coef. (Std.Err.) 
       
HPIi    --   0.001   0.002 
    (0.001) ***  (0.001) *** 
GNIi  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001) ***  (0.001) *  (0.001) * 
TRADEi   0.001  -0.001   0.001 
  (0.001) ***  (0.001)  (0.001) 
       
 
Statistical details:  
  
      
Wald test (eq. 1): p-value   0.000   0.000   0.000 
R-square (eq. 1)   0.586   0.100   0.194 
Wald test (eq. 2): p-value   0.000   0.000   0.000 
R-square (eq. 2)   0.428   0.548   0.546 
Sargan test [p-value]   2.074 [>5%]   4.655[>5%]   4.743[>5%] 
       
Note: level of confidence of statistical significance (“*” = 90%, “**” = 95%, “***” = 99%).  
Source: OECD, 2008. 
 
